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Abstract
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This paper provides evidence from one of the poorest 
countries of the world that the property rights matter for 
efficiency, investment, and growth. With all land state-
owned, the threat of land redistribution never appears 
far off the agenda. Land rental and leasing have been 
made legal, but transfer rights remain restricted and 
the perception of continuing tenure insecurity remains 
quite strong. Using a unique panel data set, this study 
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investigates whether transfer rights and tenure insecurity 
affect household investment decisions, focusing on trees 
and shrubs. The panel data estimates suggest that limited 
perceived transfer rights, and the threat of expropriation, 
negatively affect long-term investment in Ethiopian 
agriculture, contributing to the low returns from land 
and perpetuating low growth and poverty. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The central role of secure property rights in growth has long been recognized (Coase,  1960; 
Demsetz, 1967; North, 1981). Property rights protect individuals against expropriation by 
neighbors and other agents, as well as against the state, offering incentives for long-term 
investments in assets. Institutions such as property rights have been shown to be an important 
factor in explaining growth and the lack thereof in parts of the world (North and Weingast, 
1989; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003). In this paper, we add to the limited micro-evidence on 
linking insecure property rights to capital accumulation. We focus on Africa, the region were 
growth has been lagging most strikingly in recent decades and where risk to assets has been put 
forward as a crucial determinant of this growth failure (Collier and Gunning, 1998). More 
specifically, we study Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries in the world, and the role of 
insecurity in property rights for land on long-term investment in land-specific assets, such as 
trees and shrubs. Our study uses longitudinal plot-level and household data to provide micro-
level evidence on the link between transfer rights and perceptions of the threat of 
expropriation, and capital accumulation. 
 
This paper adds to the literature in a number of ways. First, it builds on Besley’s (1995) paper 
on investment in trees in Ghana by using panel data on the accumulation of capital, rather than a 
cross-section data set. It also extends this work by adding perceptions of the threat of expropriation 
by the state to the analysis. In this way, it is not dissimilar to the study by Jacoby et al. (2002) on 
China, but with a key difference that rather than calibrating ‘objective’ risks of appropriation 
based on past data, we have access to perceived threats, arguably more important for forward-
looking investment behavior. We find that both perceptions related to the threat of expropriation, 
as well as the perceived rights to transfer land to others are important for investment on the 
land, with crucial efficiency and growth implications. The institutions of property rights matter to 
understand limited investment and growth, this time based on evidence from one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Unpacking these institutions, we find that perceived transfer rights, rather 
than a relatively short-term threat of expropriation, are quantitatively the more important factor 
explaining relatively low investment. 
 
  2Land remains a most crucial asset for households in Ethiopia. More than 80 percent of the 
population still lives in rural areas, contributing about half of GDP via agricultural production. The 
main export products are agricultural, with coffee still providing two-thirds of foreign exchange 
earnings. Despite recent policies to stimulate intensification, land productivity remains low in 
most parts of Ethiopia. Furthermore, as a land-locked economy with few natural resources, 
growth in agriculture remains a crucial part of an overall economic growth and poverty reduction 
strategy. 
 
The question of whether land tenure insecurity has an impact on investment remains therefore an 
important policy question in Ethiopia; it is also politically a deeply sensitive issue. All land is 
owned by the State and individuals are given only use rights; land cannot be sold, exchanged 
or mortgaged. Despite land tenure reforms in the 1990s, there continues to be a widespread 
perception of the threat of expropriation, or at least a perception that land cannot be 
transferred to family or others. The right to land for anyone who wishes to make a living by 
farming is now enshrined in the constitution, and with a rapidly growing population, the pressure 
for land redistribution remains high in many areas of the country. Land rental markets have been 
legalized in recent years, lifting extensive restrictions on rental and sharecropping. However, 
the terms for such arrangements remain somewhat restrictive and the regional land 
proclamations (the regional governments are now responsible for land policy) remain ambiguous 
about land redistribution and tenure security (Rahmato, 2004) 
 
A number of recent papers have looked at the impact of local tenure arrangements on efficiency. 
Pender and Fafchamps (2001) find that land lease markets (sharecropping and rental) work 
sufficiently well to suggest that land market imperfections are not a cause of inefficiency in 
variable input use. But a key question remains whether land tenure insecurity and limited 
transferability of land hinder more fundamental long-term investments in agriculture. In this 
paper, we focus on three forms of perennial crop investment: two tree crops, coffee and 
eucalyptus and one shrub, chat (or q’at, whose young leaves are chewed and acts as a relatively 
mild but addictive stimulant). They are qualitatively different: coffee and chat involve a sunk 
investment but coffee has a longer gestation period, while eucalyptus is fast growing and easily 
uprooted to retrieve the investment. All three are important cash crops. 
  3We use panel data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey covering four rounds from the 
period 1994 to 1999 to assess whether transfer rights land tenure insecurity has affected 
investment in trees in this period. Using household panel data allows us to control for a number 
of standard problems in analyzing this issue including the endogeneity related to the reverse 
causality of explaining tree planting to obtain land rights, measurement error in our property rights 
data, household-level heterogeneity affecting perceptions of security and transferability, as well as 
allowing us to identify any effects on investment from changes over time rather than cross-sectional 
variation (only). 
 
In theory, there is a general consensus that making land rights more secure and transferable would 
promote investment incentives and efficient use of resources. This conventional view has three major 
justifications. First, it is believed that secure rights provide a guarantee to farmers that the fruits of 
their investments will not be appropriated by government or other agents. This encourages them to 




The second effect works through the credit market. As pointed out by Feder and Onchan (1987), 
security of ownership improves chances of obtaining loans to finance agricultural investments. This 
is because ownership rights facilitate the development of an efficient land market. This reduces 
information costs for the lender and provides the basis for using land as a collateral asset. Finally, 
secure tenure rights would allow a relaxation of the impediments to factor mobility and hence 
enables the allocation of land from the less to the most productive farmers, including via lease 
markets. Moreover, it allows farmers to make immobile investments since they will be sure to 
recuperate the present value of the future income that would be generated by the investment. 
 
Several recent studies, however, argue that causality may also run the other way round: 
investments on land, particularly planting trees, enhance tenure security (Atwood, 1990; Besley, 
1995; Otsuka et al., 1997; Brasselle et al., 2002). There have been several empirical investigations 
                                                           
1 Theoretical justifications for this relationship are derived in Besley (1995). A dynamic stochastic programming 
model, allowing for gestation lags in benefiting from the investment as well accounting for the irreversibility of 
these investments can be found in Daniel Ayalew (2003). Deininger et al. (2003) helpfully clarify in a simple model 
  4into the relationship between land tenure and investment, but the existing evidence is largely 
inconclusive (see Brasselle et al., 2002 for the survey of empirical studies in Africa). In spite of 
the conventional belief, only a few studies have confirmed that tenure insecurity is a serious 
impediment to land-related investments, largely confined to Asia (Feder 1988) or Latin America 
(Carter and Olinto, 2002); Besley (1995) provides evidence of this nature for Ghana. Some recent 
studies, however, show that land rights have little effect on land improving investments and 
planting tree crops, not least in Africa (e.g. Migot-Adholla et al. 1994, Pinckney and Kimuyu 
1994). In fact, some affirm the existence of reverse causality, i.e., that farmers may undertake land 
investments in order to enhance tenure security (Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997; Place and Otsuka, 
2002; Brasselle et al., 2002). These findings have cast considerable doubt on the need for 
embarking on ambitious land registration and titling policies. Some authors have even argued that 
the current traditional tenure systems in Africa have the necessary elements to stimulate small-
scale investments. Consequently, they have underscored that developing land rights alone might 
not be a panacea for problems of low agricultural investment and land productivity. Thus, there 
still remains a need for proper understanding of the evolution of property rights along with a 
careful empirical investigation of the links between land rights and investment (Besley, 1995). 
 
In view of this, unbundling the institutions of property rights is necessary to ensure a careful 
interpretation of findings. Following North (1981), Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) define property 
rights as the rules and regulations that protect citizens against the power of the government and 
elites. Contrary to papers that have to rely on interpreting customary laws and the protection they 
entail, we can rely on two related but empirically distinguishable concepts: transfer rights and 
the threat of expropriation (‘security’). The former are measured at the plot-level, and simply 
consider whether the household head thinks that a plot can be transferred to someone else. We also 
asked whether households perceived that land reform and redistribution would result in land been 
taken away from them in the next five years. Both measures are used in the paper. 
 
Finally, since land is such a central concern in the policy debate, this issue has attracted 
precedents in terms of research in Ethiopia. The very few rigorous empirical studies have produced 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the issue of endogeneity in the relationship between land rights and tree investment alluded to in Bruce (1988) and 
Besley (1995). 
  5mixed results on the relationship between tenure status and land-attached investments. Using 
survey data from Central Ethiopia, Gavin and Ehui (1999) did not find any empirical basis to 
support the hypothesis that land tenure was a constraint on agricultural productivity. Fafchamps 
and Pender (2001) similarly suggest that variable input use was not affected by the variety of rural 
tenure contracts under which production takes place. Their results indicated that farmers apply 
more or less the same amount of inputs on land under informal and less secure contracts 
(rented, sharecropped and borrowed) and on lands formally allocated to them via the local 
authorities. Arguably, the concern in these studies is with variable inputs, and since their returns 
are captured in the short run, security and transferability are unlikely to be a negative 
constraint on production decisions.
2
 
Studies focusing on more long-term investments also do not necessarily find negative effects 
from tenure insecurity. Holden and Hailu Yohannes (2002) investigated the planting of perennial 
crops using data from 15 different sites in Southern Ethiopia. They showed that tenure insecurity 
has little effect on the decision of farmers to plant perennials. On the other hand, they identified 
resource poverty as the main factor that has led to under investment in tree crops. Based on 
nationally representative survey data, Deininger et al. (2003) argued that the impact of tenure 
insecurity varies across types of investments. In line with this, they found out that tenure insecurity 
has encouraged planting (any) trees while discouraging investment in terraces. There is little or 
no evidence that resource constraints have adversely affected both investments. 
Gebremedhin and Swinton (2001) suggest that farmers’ perceived land tenure security in Tigray 
was significantly and positively associated with long-term durable soil conservation investments 
such as stone terraces. Gebremedhin et al. (2003) argued from village level data that perceived 
tenure security increased land investments. 
 
Many of these studies suffer from specific data or methodological limitations. For example, 
typically only a cross-section is available, measures of security and transferability are incomplete 
and endogeneity of tenure security cannot be appropriately addressed. Deininger et al. (2003) can 
account for these issues to some extent, but only observe propensities to invest and only over a 
                                                           
2 Indeed, there would be incentives related to tenure insecurity to overexploit the soil in the short run, leading to 
higher productivity in the short run. 
  6limited period of time, and only for broad categories of investments such as ‘trees’ in general. In 
this paper we can exploit a large plot level four-round panel data set covering 1994 to 1999, with 
time-varying information on perceptions of transferability and across different areas and can 
focus on actual allocations to specific tree crops, rather than propensities to invest. 
 
In the next section, we first give an overview of the recent experience with land rights and 
security in Ethiopia, as well as any evidence on its consequences. In section 3, we present the data 
available and in section 4 we explain the modelling approach. In section 5 we present the 
results. A discussion of the policy implications of these results concludes the paper. 
 
2. Land rights in Ethiopia 
 
The land tenure system in Ethiopia has its own peculiarities. After ousting the imperial 
regime, the military government (the Derg) nationalized land in 1975 and subsequently distributed 
use rights to cultivators through local peasant associations. This system strictly prohibited private 
ownership of land, and transfer of land by sale, lease or mortgage. Periodic land redistribution was 
based primarily on family size. This was to accommodate the needs of new claimants, but as a 
result widespread land tenure insecurity was instigated in the rural areas. For example, in the data 
set used in this paper, more than a third of the households reported having lost land at one point 
or another during this period. 
 
After the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, land redistribution was temporarily suspended without 
any provision to address the needs of the landless and the land hungry. The practice of repeated 
land redistribution had been already frozen in 1989, as part of the market-oriented reforms 
undertaken by the Derg. But the land policy has basically stayed the same and the 1995 constitution 
has simply reiterated the previous policy with just minor amendments. It has restated that land 
remains the collective property of the state and the peoples of Ethiopia and a mandate is given to 
regional governments for its administration. Accordingly, a farmer who wants to make a livelihood 
from farming is entitled to have a plot of land free of charge (Federal Republic of Ethiopia, 2002). 
In line with this guiding principle, the policy provides usufruct rights to rural households while 
  7strictly prohibiting sale, exchange for other property or mortgage. However, a major improvement 
is that land leasing to a third party is allowed under the current system
3. 
 
But the policy is still unclear and land redistribution has taken place in some areas to provide land 
to new claimants. An instance of this is the 1997 land redistribution in the Amhara region. This 
redistribution affected land covered by perennials, and contrary to the stated policy compensation 
was not paid to the former owners (Holden and Hailu Yohannes, 2002). This has created fear 
among farmers that they will be subjected to possible land redistribution without compensation at 
any time in the near future. Based on a nationally representative survey of farm households, 
Deininger et al. (2003) found out that 9 percent of the farmers were affected by land 
redistribution in the 1991-98 period. Also, less than a third of the farmers expected that there 
would not be land redistribution in the near future even though there is an intent for policy to 
discourage such practices. In the data set used in this paper, these results are reiterated: about 
7 percent of households in 1999 lost land during land redistribution in the last five years, 
while 11 percent of households expected to loose land themselves in the next five years due 
land reform, and 10 percent expected to gain. 
 
Policy makers appear to state regularly that secure usufruct rights are crucial and some efforts 
have been made to formalize this, such as in the form of land titling exercises in Tigray. But the 
overall perception remains that recurring land reform is here to stay, contributing to substantial 
insecurity of tenure. 
 
3. The Data 
 
This paper exploits household panel data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) 
covering the period 1994 to 1999. The survey initially covered about 1470 households in 18 
Peasant Associations in 15 Woredas throughout the country. The villages were initially selected 
to reflect some of the diversity in agro-climatic conditions in Ethiopia. Geographically, these 
Woredas are located in Tigray (2), Amhara (4), Oromiya (4) and SNNP (5). 
                                                           
3 Informal arrangements in the form of sharecropping or fixed rent tenancy were taking place even during the Derg 
regime at the risk of losing land. 
  8During this period, four rounds of data gathering collected detailed information on land 
allocation to different crops. For the purposes of this paper, we focus, first, on the share of each 
plot allocated to coffee. Coffee is a tree crop requiring a long-term investment perspective. Coffee 
trees only start yielding about 3-4 years after planting, reaching full potential only after 8 years. 
Then, trees can maintain high production levels for several decades. Cutting down trees yields 
virtually no return, so this is a clear irreversible investment. For the purposes of our analysis, 
only four PAs in woredas in SNNP have agro-climatic conditions conducive to growing coffee
4. 
The second crop to focus on is eucalyptus. This tree crop is rather different in that it can yield a 
return after only a few years, either by cutting it down entirely or simply cutting by branches, 
and hence is more of a medium-term investment. It would be possible to recoup a reasonable part 
of the investment; still, it is likely to have to occur at a sub-optimal time for the household. It 
is in general grown both for providing ‘subsistence’ firewood as well as for cash. To measure 
the impact of security and transferability on the share of land allocated to eucalyptus we use data 
from the same villages as for coffee. Finally, we consider chat. Chat (or q’at) is a relatively 
drought-resistant evergreen shrub, somewhat resembling tea plants, and cultivated as a cash crop. 
The young leaves of this plant are widely appreciated in Ethiopia and neighboring countries for 
their effects as a stimulant with mild narcotic impact, resembling the effects of amphetamines. The 
shrub is a perennial that starts yielding substantial return after about 2-3 years. As a shrub, it only 
has limited use as a source of firewood or building material when cut down. It would appear that 
eucalyptus and chat do not have similar sunk costs and long gestation periods as coffee; still, 
they are investments with medium-term horizon. Secure property rights are likely to be relevant 
for all these investments. 
 
Tenure security and transfer rights are likely to matter for investment in these crops. Obviously, 
other factors will matter as well – including whether it is profitable to do so irrespective of 
security concerns, requiring any regression analysis to appropriately control for other factors. 
Planting trees may also have other effects beyond direct profitability concerns. Tree cover has 
further environmental effects, including increasing biomass and providing ground cover. In most of 
the coffee growing areas – typically with relatively high rainfall and fertile land suitable for 
                                                           
4 They are Cheha (near Imdibir, Gurage), Kedida (in Kembata), Bule (near Dilla in Sidamo) and Boloso (about 
30 km from Sodo). 
  9permanent and rather intensive cropping – these benefits are helpful but possibly as yet not a 
crucial issue. In the case of eucalyptus, the environmental benefits and also costs need to be 
looked at more carefully, not least since it can be grown in most pats of the country, including 
on land of relatively low fertility. 
 
The planting of eucalyptus trees used to be largely confined to State owned plantations and 
community woodlots, but increasingly it is also grown on household farms (Jagger and Pender 
(2001)) It is considered a better performing species than many indigenous sources of wood, since 
it grows fast and is rather resilient, providing a helpful source of woody biomass, and contributes 
to limiting erosion and land degradation. Nevertheless, it also has proven negative externalities on 
crop production on nearby plots, and part for this reason the regional government of Tigray has 
even banned eucalyptus on land suitable for crop production, even though there is little or no 
evidence of enforcement of this ban. Some researchers, e.g. Jagger and Pender (2001) have 
questioned the magnitude of these ecological risks, arguing that the potential ecological and 
income benefits far outweigh these costs. In any case, in many areas were eucalyptus is not 
banned, it can provide a ready source of cash income, and tenure security may well influence the 
decision to plant trees, allowing us to use it as an example for assessing the impact of 
transferability and security on investment decisions.  
 
Descriptive statistics on the plot level data are given in table 1. A plot is defined as a clearly 
identifiable piece of land, as the farmer himself or herself decides to demarcate it.
5 To identify 
land tenure security and transferability, a number of variables are available. First, we have 
plot level data for each of the four rounds on the mode of acquisition (i.e. whether the plot was 
bought before land reform, acquired from the state during land redistribution, rented or 
sharecropped in, or inherited). Table 1 also gives data on this for our sample. About 72 percent of 
plots are inherited. Land purchases largely refer to pre-land reform of 1975 purchases (after which 
                                                           
5 One particular feature of the available data should be highlighted here. The data were collected as a household level 
panel, not a plot level panel. Matching of plots has proved difficult and is not attempted for the purposes of this 
paper. In each round, households were asked to give us details about their plots. Questions were asked without 
specific reference to past information gathered. Since this part of the questionnaire always proved one of the 
most difficult parts to complete, the respondents’ own concept of the plots it cultivates at present dominates. 
Furthermore, the analysis is conducted using an unbalanced panel. Attrition (although only about 7 percent 
between 1994 and 1999) will have reduced the number of plots in the sample while newly added plots increased the 
sample. 
  10it became illegal although some sales have been reported in some of the villages studied), and 
only constitute a small percentage overall. About 5 percent of plots are sharecropped, and about 10 
percent of plots were allocated by the government as part of land reform. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – plot level variables – selected villages from ERHS 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Plot size (ha)   0.232  0.436 
Share of land allocated to coffee*  0.214  0.290 
Share of land allocated to chat  0.056  0.194 
Share of land allocated to eucalyptus  0.075  0.245 
Land with at least some coffee (dummy=1)**
  0.448 0.497 
Chat land (dummy=1)  0.104  0.305 
Eucalyptus land (dummy=1)   0.107  0.309 
Plot inherited %  0.717  0.451 
Plot purchased %  0.104  0.305 
Plot allocated %  0.096  0.294 
Plot sharecropped in/rented in %  0.045  0.207 
Number of years plot owned  31.667  15.711 
Good soil fertility %  0.521  0.500 
Medium soil fertility %  0.370  0.483 
Poor soil fertility %  0.099  0.299 
Flat plot %  0.620  0.485 
Slopy plot %  0.327  0.469 
Steep plot with ravines %  0.041  0.198 
Note: Data on 3364 plots. Pooled data from four rounds of data (1994, 1995, 1997, 1999). Data on ‘Numbers of 
years plot owned’ not available for 1995 round. 
*The shares of total farm land allocated to coffee, chat and eucalyptus (i.e., at the household level) are 0.22, 0.035 and 
0.049, respectively. Average farm size (cropped area) is 0.70 Ha. 
**Some plots are intercropped and this has been taken into account for share of plots allocated with particular crops. 
So while 44.8 percent of plots have some coffee, the average share of each plot is only 21.4 percent. 
 
Inherited land relative to land allocated or sharecropped may appear surprisingly high in the 
overall context of Ethiopia. In the full country-wide data set (of which the data in this paper are a 
sub-sample), inherited land only constitutes about a quarter of the land, while government 
allocated land is about 55 percent and sharecropped land is most of the remainder. These figures 
are not dissimilar to those found in other data sets (such as Deininger et al., 2003). Permanent 
crop areas and the South of the country in general had a substantially different land tenure system 
before land reform in 1975, and land reform allowed many households in the South to cultivate 
land they were farming at the time and had inherited from their families, while in the more 
  11Northern regions (especially Amhara, Tigray and Oromiya) the traditional Rist system meant that 
large land owning families cultivated at times vast areas, and reform meant an effective transfer 
for many. If anything, this would suggest that the areas studied in this paper have enjoyed 
historically relatively more secure tenure, and thus this sub-sample provides a tougher test of the 
impact of tenure security. 
 
Mode of acquisition may provide some information on transfer rights, but there is by no means a 
simple direct mapping. We have a direct measure at the plot level whether the household 
perceives that the specific plot of land can be passed on to someone else (including via 
inheritance), although in this case only for the 1997 and 1999 round of data collection. Table 2 
summarizes these data. A few interesting features emerge. First, households perceive that only 
about 60 percent of plots they cultivate could be transferred to others, including via inheritance, 
despite the fact that more than 80 percent of plots were either purchased or inherited. Indeed, even 
though farmers may have been allowed to keep land despite periods of land reform, they do not 
perceive that the usufruct rights will be perpetual. It is also striking that perceived transfer rights are 
statistically significantly lower in 1999 compared to 1997.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – plot level variables - selected villages ERHS 
Variable 1997  1999 
Transfer rights (dummy=1 if yes)* 0.65  0.53
transfer rights on inherited plots 0.71  0.57
transfer rights on purchased plots 0.83  0.50 
transfer rights on allocated plots 0.69  0.53
transfer rights on sharecropped plots 0.00  0.25 
Share of total land (sum of plots in ha) with transfer rights**  0.66  0.48 
Number of plots  1212  939 
*The difference in transfer rights between 1997 and 1999 is statistically significant in all but one cases at the 99% 
level, the exception is for allocated plots, where the significance level is 95%. ** 66 percent of total 
land size (measured by the sum of the size of all the plots in ha) had perceived transfer rights in the 4
th round, while 
this percentage declined to 48 percent in the 5
th round. 
 
The second data point is after the news on the new land reform in Amhara region will have 
filtered through, and even though the villages in the sample are outside this region, it surely will 
have affected people’s perceptions. Finally, transfer rights do not map directly into modes of 
acquisition. For example, people perceive transfer rights on allocated plots, and in 1999 even on 
  12some sharecropped plots (although the number of plots involved for sharecropping is rather small 
so these numbers are sensitive to relatively few plots recorded incorrectly). The decline in 
perceived transfer rights on non-rented plots is also occurring irrespective of mode of acquisition. 
 
Data on transfer rights can be relatively straightforwardly collected per plot. Land tenure 
insecurity is likely to be different: it refers to a specific perception that land may be lost via 
land reform. To measure this we have access to a history of land reform (i.e. did the 
household lose or gain any land during the pre-1991 land reform episodes), land losses during 
recent land reform during the data collection period, as well as questions on whether the 
household expects to loose land in the next 5 years and how. Jacoby et al. (2002) use data on 
land lost in a hazard model to get at the risk of expropriation. Perception data, since they are by 
their nature forward-looking, are arguably more appropriate to think about investment decisions. 
These data were collected in the 1999 round, except for the data on pre-1991 land losses during 
land reform. Table 3 suggests substantial insecurity, whichever way used to measure it. Quite 
a few households (21 percent) lost land during land reform, although few did so in the most recent 
period, between 1994 and 1999
6. Land sharing, losing land to other family members is also an 
important concern (30 percent). Most importantly for our discussion, and about 5 percent perceive 
that they will lose land in land reallocation in the next five years. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of household level variables: land tenure security: selected 
ERHS villages (measured in 1999 unless explicitly stated) 
 
Variable 1999 
Land Reform and Reallocation Experience  
Land lost at the time of land reform and land reallocation (based on round 1, 
1994, recall data) (%)  0.21 
Lost land during the last five years due to land redistribution (%) 0.01
Lost land during the last five years due to land sharing among family (%)  0.09 
Perception of Land Insecurity in the Coming Five Years  
Decrease in land size due to land reallocation (%)  0.05 
Decrease in land size due to sharing among family members (%)  0.30 
Number of household observations  366 
                                                           
6 This is again less than elsewhere in the country. The full sample of the ERHS suggested that about 34 percent lost 
land during land reform, and 7 percent lost land in the last five years. This is consistent with other data reported 
earlier related to land reform. 
  134. Method and econometric model 
 
We have detailed plot level information on land allocated to different perennial or tree crops. We 
also have detailed information on the mode of acquisition and the perceived transfer rights at 
the plot level. Furthermore, we have information at the household level of perceived land tenure 
insecurity and land redistribution history. The core research question is whether transfer rights, 
i.e. the perceived right to pass on a specific piece of land, and land tenure security, i.e. the 
perceived sense of security, matter for investment in coffee, eucalyptus and chat. Equation (1) 
describes the general model guiding our analysis, given the data available: 
 
Kiht=ah +  b.Zh+ c.Wh + d.Sh + e.Pih + f.Tih +  g.Xht + k.Vht + eiht     (1) 
 
where ‘iht’ refers to plot i cultivated by household h in period t and K is some ‘capital’ good on 
land (e.g. trees), here used as the share of land allocated to tree crops. In equation (1), ah are 
fixed unobservable household characteristics, Zh are observable fixed household characteristics, 
Wh are fixed community characteristics and Sh are household level tenure security variables. Pih 
are fixed plot characteristics (soil quality, slopes) and Tih are fixed plot level transferability 
indicators. Finally, Xht are time varying household level characteristics and Vht are time-varying 
community characteristics. 
 
Many factors affect a households’ decision to invest in land. A central concern will be to 
estimate any relevant effects related to transfer rights and tenure security as carefully as 
possible. One key part of our strategy will be that if there is any effect potentially identified at the 
plot level, we will do so at this level.
7 In particular, to estimate the impact of the perceived rights 
to transfer a particular plot, the estimation of this effect will first be done controlling for 
household level fixed effects, so that any unobservable household level effect missing from 
the model (such as a tendency of some households to either overstate or understate the ability to 
transfer plots when asked about it) will not bias the coefficient of the impact of transfer rights. 
In particular, the model estimated will be: 
                                                           
7 Recall, however, that our data set is a household level panel data set, and a not plot level panel data set: plots 
cannot be matched over time. 
  14 
Kiht= θh  + e.Pih + f.Tih +  g.Xht + k.Vht + eiht      (2) 
 
In this model, Vht will be controlled for using time-varying village dummies, thereby avoiding 
the need to include variables such as agro-climatic conditions or prices, which would surely 
affect investment into trees but are not variables of interest in this particular paper.  Equation (2) 
will form the basis for the three regressions reported in the next section. First, a regression using 
‘mode of acquisition’ variables (such as whether the plot was government allocated, inherited, 
bought, rented or sharecropped, etc.), controlling for plot characteristics, time-varying household 
characteristics and village level time-varying fixed effects, estimated using household level fixed 
effects. Secondly, a regression in which Tih, the (self-reported) perceived ‘transfer rights’ related 
to the particular plot are added, and dropping the ‘mode of acquisition’ variables, and otherwise 
identical to the previous regression.  
 
Finally, a regression as the previous one is run, but in which Tih is treated as endogenous, 
using the mode of acquisition (purchased, inherited, allocated or sharecropped) and the years of 
cultivating this particular plot as identifying instruments. The latter regression allows then an 
investigation of whether households plant trees to try to strengthen their ownership rights (as in 
Besley 1995). If one reason that, relatively speaking, more trees are planted on a particular 
plot is to increase perceived transfer rights on this plot, then one would expect that, after 
instrumenting, the coefficient on transfer rights would go down, in line with standard simultaneity 
bias effects. However, instrumenting will also remove any measurement error bias that would have 




All fixed household level characteristics on investing in trees are perfectly captured by θh. This 
estimated variable will contain many different observable and unobservable household fixed 
characteristics, including the general sense of land tenure security of the household. Since we 
have some measured variables informing us about this perception at the level of the households, 
two routes are possible. First, introducing these perception variables into (2), effectively 
                                                           
8 This argument is formally shown for our type of specification in Besley, 1995. 
  15estimating a version of (1) and dropping the household fixed effect. The alternative route used 
here is to ‘unpacking’ θh by first retrieving this fixed effect from the resulting regressions and 
then regressing it on a set of household fixed characteristics, including the household level 
means of some of the plot-level variables. Note that while θh may well be measured with error if 
only based on a relatively small sample, by putting it on the left hand side of a regression, this is 
in itself not a problem, not least since by assumption it is an unbiased estimate of the fixed effect.  
Our next regression then becomes: 
 
θh =ah +  b.Zh+ c.Wh + d.Sh + uh      ( 3 )  
 
in which Sh  includes variables such as the household level perception regarding future land 
redistribution. 
 
This approach allows us to make many improvements relative to previous work. First, by using 
data on actual investments (rather than dummy variables on whether an investment has taken 
place), we can make statements on the levels of investment potentially forgone due to problems 
related to land rights and tenure security, rather than propensities to invest. Secondly, we are able 
to exploit the fact that we have plot specific data allows us to estimate models with household 
fixed effects, exploiting differential security of different plots (as in Besley, 1995), at least for 
those measures directly related to plots rather than the household (i.e. those linked to actual 
tenure status, not related to the household’s history and perception of security). Furthermore, by 
exploiting the properties of the estimated household fixed effect, we can go beyond Besley’s 
analysis by conducting a household level impact analysis of tenure insecurity as well. Finally, the 
panel data and the detailed plot level history of each plot also allow us to address the possible 
endogeneity of transfer rights and tenure insecurity. 
 
This does not mean that no serious econometric problems remain to be solved. First, the left 
hand side variable is models (1) and (2) contains a significant number of zero observations, for 
example about half for coffee and more for the other crops, so we need to explore how 
censoring affects the findings. Unfortunately, in standard nonlinear models, such as the logit and 
probit model, the fixed effects cannot be treated as incidental parameters without biasing the other 
  16model coefficients (as long as N > T) (Hsiao, 1986). By implication, the tobit fixed effects model 
is also considered problematic. However, Greene (2003) noted that there was surprisingly 
little theoretical and empirical evidence on the behavior of the maximum likelihood estimator on 
which to base this conclusion. His Monte Carlo simulations lead him to suggest that the problems 
are much less important than usually assumed for the tobit model: more specifically, the bias in the 
slope parameters are very small for T larger than 5. The bias is also smallest when the degree of 
censoring is approximately 50 percent (which is satisfied for coffee but not for the other crops). 
The standard errors may however be underestimated leading to overoptimistic inference. 
 
Given that we estimate household fixed effects on plot level data, our T is in fact the number of 
plots per household – on average about 3 per round, so in all our estimations T tends to be 
above 5. As a consequence, we base our analysis on estimating a fixed effect tobit model 
based on (2), and use the retrieved fixed effects as in (3). However, to investigate robustness of 
our estimated variables of interest, we will also use a Chamberlain (1980) tobit random effects 
model (Wooldridge, 2002). In this approach, the problem related to the inconsistency of incidental 
fixed household characteristic is solved by using the mean value of the left hand side variable as a 
sufficient statistic of identifying the household level effect and specify the more standard 
random effects tobit with a full set of household level means of all the regressors. 
 
5. Econometric analysis and results 
 
This section presents the results based on the regressions described above. The plot level 
regressions include a number of control variables: plot size in hectares, land quality (measured 
by dummies of different quality based on local perceptions, using poor quality as the base 
group), plot slope (flat, sloping with strongly sloping as the base group), a number of time-
varying household characteristics (livestock values, total land owned, female adults and male 
adults) and a time-varying village level dummies.
9
 
                                                           
9 The tables only report key variables of interest, and not the control variables. A version with full regression 
results is available upon request. 
  17Table 4 reports the results for the share of land allocated to coffee. We report the fixed effects 
tobit regression results, as well as the random effects tobit findings. Table 5 presents a probit with 
robust standard errors and a random effects probit, explaining transfer rights at the plot level. This 
regression is used subsequently as the first stage regression in table 4 for instrumenting transfer 
rights. The first regression in table 4 shows that modes of acquisition matter. Relative to the base 
group, land allocated by the government, farmers are growing about 49 percent less coffee on 
sharecropped plots. The latter result may seem self-evident, but in the data sharecropped plots 
often still have coffee on them. While non-sharecropped plots have about 22 percent of the land 
allocated to coffee on average, sharecropped plots have on average about 9 percent of land 
with coffee.
10 Furthermore, and most important for our analysis, farmers grow about 9 percent 
more coffee on inherited plots, than in government allocated plots. 
 
Column (2) shows the impact of using perceived transfer rights, rather than the more indirect route 
of modes of acquisition, to discuss the impact on coffee growing. It can be seen that transfer 
rights make a difference, and farmer grow typically 13 percent more coffee on plots with 
reported transfer rights relative to one without these rights. This regression uses however the 
uninstrumented transfer rights. Both the reverse causality bias (endogeneity of transfer rights 
since tree planting may increase rights) as well as measurement error may affect this estimate, 
so we decided to instrument this variable. Table 5 presents probit regressions, one with robust 
standard errors and another one with random effects, explaining transfer rights. Recall that we 
have plot level transfer right data available for the two latest rounds used in the analysis. 
Identifying instruments used are modes of acquisition (sharecropped, inherited, purchased and a 
very small number of other means of acquisition, all defined relative to land allocated by the 
government) as well as the number of years the plot has been used or owned. We observe 
significant effects on sharecropped plots (as expected, reducing perceived transfer rights), and 
inherited plots and the number of years the plot has been owned (both raising transfer rights), 
besides a number of other characteristics.
11 The predicted values of the random effects model are 
                                                           
10 This is not so in the case of eucalyptus or chat, with less than 1 percent of land with these crops if the plot is 
sharecropped. 
11 Marginal effects show for example that 10 years longer use or ownership of a plot increases perceived transfer 
rights by 4 percent and an inherited plot was 9 percent more likely to be perceived to be transferable, relative to a 
plot allocated by the government. 
  18used and it is clear that while sharecropping matters to explain transfer rights, identification will not 
exclusively depend on this more obvious source of absence of transfer rights. 
 











































Inherited plot?  0.087 
(2.53) 
     
Purchased plot?  0.029 
(0.63) 





   -0.411 
(4.92) 
  -0.326 
(3.95) 










Note: All regression controls for plot size, total land owned per adult, livestock owned per adult, plot quality (high 
quality, medium quality and low quality), slope (flat, sloping, steep), number of male adults, number of female 
adults, sex of head, age of head and age head squared, village times time dummies. Base group in (1) for plot mode of 
acquisition: land allocated by government. 
* Full IV, transfer rights endogenous with modes of acquisition (inherited, purchased, allocated, sharecropped) 
and number of years plot used by this household – see table 5. 
** Full IV, but second stage controls for sharecropped plots. 
 
Columns (3) and (4) give the fixed effects tobit regression explaining land allocated to coffee, using 
the instrumented transfer rights. In column (3), all the modes of acquisition restrictions have 
been dropped and used as identifying instruments. However, it could well be argued that in the 
case of sharecropped plots, this may not be an appropriate exclusion restriction, since 
investment decision may well be mediated by the contractual issues surrounding sharecropping, 
in quite a different way from land that is inherited or given by the government. In this way, 
excluding the sharecropped plot variable may not be correct. Column (4) gives the results, 
including the sharecropped plot variable. Both in (3) and (4), the coefficient on perceived 
transfer rights is strongly significant and higher than in (2), suggesting that measurement error 
  19dominates the reverse causality (endogeneity) of land rights argument. The sharecropped plot 
variable is also strongly significant in (4), reducing the transfer right variable effect, and 
suggesting that it should not be excluded. The interpretation is that if a plot has complete transfer 
rights, one would expect a share allocated to coffee that is about 31 percent higher than for a plot 
without perceived transfer rights. 
 
As was discussed before, the use of the fixed effects tobit regression is not without controversy. 
Greene’s (2003) arguments would however be supportive for using it in our case: a reasonably 
large number of plots per household, and a degree of censoring not far from about half the sample. 
Nevertheless, for robustness, we also estimated the model using a random effects tobit model. We 
report regressions using the instrumented transfer rights variable as before and, with and without a 
control for sharecropped plots. As can be seen, the estimated coefficients are extremely close to 
those in the fixed effects version, suggesting that the estimates and the conclusions derived from 
them are very robust. 
 
Table 5: Transfer rights: Probit regressions (t-value in brackets) 




 coefficient  (t-value)  Coefficient  (t-value) 
Sharecropped  -1.067 (4.91) -1.996 (6.72) 
Inherited  0.242 (2.35) 0.340 (1.94) 
Purchased 0.413  (2.90)  -0.125  (0.46) 
Other  mode  0.456 (1.13) 0.095 (0.17) 
Years  owned  0.010 (3.83) 0.020 (3.74) 
Plot  size  -0.104 (1.48) -0.101 (0.89) 
Relative  land  -0.096 (2.43) 0.002 (0.02) 
Land per aeu  0.402  (1.27)  1.427  (2.81) 
Livestock per aeu  -0.001  (3.50)  -0.001  (2.64) 
High quality land  -0.102  (0.86)  -0.525  (2.37) 
Medium  land  -0.076 (0.61) -0.234 (1.11) 
Flat  plot  -0.702 (3.35) -1.309 (3.69) 
Slopy  plot  -0.472 (1.45) -1.318 (3.64) 
Note: Village dummies interacted by time included but not reported, as is age head, age head squared, sex head, female 
adults and male adults. Aeu is adult equivalent units based on nutritional equivalence scales. 
 
Table 6 reports the results for chat and for eucalyptus. Column (1) shows the uninstrumented 
fixed effects tobit regression for chat showing significant effects for transfer rights. A fixed 
  20effects regression with instrumented transfer rights is in (2), and as before, the coefficient is 
significant and higher. Recall however that the fixed effects tobit regression may be more 
problematic in this case (given the more substantial censoring). The random effects regressions 
broadly confirm the results, however, with strongly positive and significant effects. Controlling 
for sharecropped plots does not substantially change the results, and sharecropped plots are 
not significant in (4). This pattern of results is broadly confirmed in column (5) to (8), this time for 
eucalyptus, and the regression using instrumented transfer rights showing strongly positive and 
significant effects. 
 
Table 6: Chat and Eucalyptus: Panel Tobit Regression (t-value in brackets) 
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Note: All regression controls for plot size, total land owned per adult, livestock owned per adult, plot quality (high 
quality, medium quality and low quality), slope (flat, sloping, steep), number of male adults, number of female 
adults, sex of head, age of head and age head squared, village times time dummies. Base group in (1) for plot mode of 
acquisition: land allocated by government. 
No fixed effects regressions with instrumented transfer rights and sharecropped plots are shown since no 
convergence could be obtained. 
* Full IY, transfer rights endogenous with modes of acquisition (inherited, purchased, allocated, sharecropped) 
and number of years plot used by this household – see table 5. 
** Full IY, but second stage controls for sharecropped plots. 
 
The results so far show that the impact of limited transfer right is surprisingly similar and large 
for all three crops considered. Since these crops are often also competing crops, we also ran the 
regressions for the overall impact of the transfer rights on either of these crops, by considering 
the total share of land allocated to coffee, eucalyptus and chat (table 7). Since coffee by far 
dominates, the regressions reflect the results for coffee. Column (3) shows that full transfer rights 
  21would increase tree and shrub cultivation by about 24 percent compared to no transfer rights – and 
only a slightly larger effect is observed using the random effects regression.
12
 
Table 7: All trees and shrubs: Panel tobit regressions (t-value in brackets) 

















































Transfer  right?  0.130 0.703 0.238 0.659  0.297 
  (3.46) (9.84) (2.26) (9.29)  (3.03) 
Note: All regression controls for plot size, total land owned per adult, livestock owned per adult, plot quality (high 
quality, medium quality and low quality), slope (flat, sloping, steep), number of male adults, number of female 
adults, sex of head, age of head and age head squared, village times time dummies. Base group in (1) for plot mode of 
acquisition: land allocated by government. 
* Full IV, transfer rights endogenous with modes of acquisition (inherited, purchased, allocated, sharecropped) 
and number of years plot used by this household – see table 5. 
** Full IV, but second stage controls for sharecropped plots. 
 
These regressions show a consistently strong impact of transfer rights on the medium and long-
run investment in trees and shrubs in this sample, based on people’s perceived transfer rights. 
We also have data on more general land tenure insecurity, in the form of a perceived ‘threat’ to 
government expropriation, as distinct from perceived transfer rights. To investigate this further, 
we retrieved the household fixed effects from the coffee land allocation regression and from the 
overall tree and shrub allocation regression, and regressed these onto a number of household 
characteristics, the insecurity variable and mean values of the right hand side variables of the 
first stage regression. 
                                                           
12 In table 6, the coefficient on sharecropped plots for chat is -5.856, which is extremely large, but it is totally 
insignificant. Only a handful of plots in the data are both sharecropped and have chat on them, so that the 
coefficient simply fits a very small number of observations. 
  22Table 8 OLS regression, with retrieved fixed effects from coffee regression as left hand 
side variable (instrumented version with sharecropping), based on model 3 
 
  Coefficient (  t-value  ) 
Insecurity? -0.132 (3.10)
Land relative to mean in village  -0.083 (3.46)
Transfer rights (mean per hh.)  -0.056  (1.51) 
Land per adult  0.785 (4.28)
Livestock per adult  -0.000  (2.84) 
Sex head 0.129 (3.08)
Females -0.025  (2.06) 
Males -0.009 (0.72)
Age head  -0.022  (3.71) 
Age head squared 0.000 (3.67)
% quality of plot high  0.596  (0.98) 
% quality of plot medium  0.476 (0.78)
% quality of plot low  0.63 1 (1.03)
% flat plot  -0.140  (0.25) 
% sloped plot  0.085  (0.15) 
% steep plot  -0.072 (0.13)




The regression results in table 8 shows a number of characteristics contributing to explain the fixed 
effects from the coffee tobit regression. The fixed effects can be interpreted as a fixed household 
level share of land allocated to coffee. Those with more land allocate higher shares, as do male 
headed households (who allocate 13 percent more than female headed households). Having 
female adults in a household reduces the share allocated to coffee. Two factors stand out in their 
impact on reducing the household level share of land allocated to coffee: those with high land 
holdings relative to the mean in the village (possibly suggesting that they may fear land 
redistribution more), and those that expressed directly a fear that their land will be taken away in 
the next five years (the insecurity variable). The latter effect is direct evidence of the role of 
insecurity: those expecting to lose land allocate on average 13 percent less land to coffee. Similar 
effects can be found by focusing on land allocated to all tree and shrub crops together. 
 
  236. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
This paper used a detailed plot level data set to investigate the impact of limited transfer rights and 
perceived land tenure insecurity on investments in coffee, chat and eucalyptus. We find strong 
evidence that the share of land allocated to coffee increases if transfer rights are present, while 
expectations of losing land in the next five years due to land reform reduces coffee planting. 
Eucalyptus and chat are also strongly responsive to transfer rights. We show that the institutions 
of property rights matter for efficiency, investment and growth, with clear evidence from one of 
the poorest countries in the world. 
 
How significant is this effect for policy? A simple extrapolation suggests that the effects are 
substantial. On average in this period, only 59 percent of plots have a full transfer rights. Moving 
this to 100 percent, and using a possibly conservative estimate of the marginal impact, based on 
the instrumented fixed or random effects tobit model (0.3 15), this would suggest that about 10 
percentage points more land would be cultivated with coffee – or an increase by more than a 
third on the 27 percent share of land allocated at present. The threat of expropriation (in the next 
five years) has substantial effects for those fearing that land will be taken away, although 
because only about 5 percent expressed this fear in 1999, the impact on average coffee 
holdings is only about 1 percentage points less land allocated to coffee. Overall, not many farmers 
appear to fear an immediate expropriation of their land, but it does not mean at all that they 
perceive to have secure transfer rights. Transfer right insecurity is a major drag on efficiency 
and growth, even if the threat of immediate expropriation is currently relatively low. A 
deficiency of the current land policy is that it does not succeed in offering transfer rights to farmers 
that would allow a more long-term planning orientation of farmers. 
 
The increases implied by the coefficients on transfer rights for eucalyptus and chat are even 
(relatively) higher. Overall, the regression using the total share to coffee, eucalyptus and chat, the 
increase would be about 9 percentage points, or still an increase by more than a quarter. While 
this expansion of coffee, eucalyptus and chat would occur at the expense of other crops, the fact 
that this effect is directly linked to tenure insecurity and transfer rights suggests a major efficiency 
loss. In these farming systems, alternative crops are limited and much land is devoted to low return 
  24staple food crops, such as enset (a root crop, sometimes called ‘false banana’). Crops constitute 
more than half of incomes in these settings, and coffee and chat are main the cash crops, so 
that increases in plantings of trees and shrubs are likely to have substantial net income effects as 
well. 
 
These results are also indicative – they show for very specific investment decisions that 
insecurity and lack of transfer rights are important. Extending this impact to other investment 
decisions would mean that the overall impact may be very large indeed (e.g., soil conservation 
measures, other land and productivity enhancing investments). Another interpretation of the 
results that directly follows from these results on cash/commercial crops is that the current policy 
appears to be pushing farmers back into low return, subsistence production by keeping their time 
horizons short and focused on single period crops. This is directly contradictory inconsistent with 
the government strategy of trying to commercialize agriculture and improve the welfare of 
farmers. 
 
The main policy implication from this analysis is that limited transfer rights and poor tenure 
security have an important negative impact on long-term investments, such as coffee and other 
tree or shrubs. While the existing evidence suggests that the impact of the control regime on 
land tenure may not have large implications for variable input use and short-run efficiency, this 
paper has shown that it may have substantial implications for growth in agriculture via its negative 
incentives on long-term investment. 
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  28ANNEX 1: Descriptive statistics – household level variables – selected ERHS villages relevant for 
regressions 









Number of female adults  2.11 2.14 1.75  1.78
Number of male adults  1.85 1.87 1.70  1.58
Age of household head 49.11 49.10 49.67  49.61
Age of household head square  2666.41  2667.79  2691.38  2687.01 
Adult equivalent units (aeu)  5.74 5.83 5.53  5.40
Land owned in hectare per aeu  0.09  0.10  0.19  0.10 
Land owned relative to mean in village 0.99 0.96 1.01 1.01
Value of livestock per aeu  119.57  119.97  167.49  144.05 
Number of plots  2.78  3.34  3.50  2.57 
Number of households  348  340  346  366 
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